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1. Introduction 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, fifteen newly independent states emerged on the international 
scene. One of the main tasks for all these newly independent states was to find a place in the new 
world order and to form new foreign policies vis-a-vis each other. Russia, as the biggest post- Soviet 
state, has remained at the cornerstone of international relations in the post- Soviet space. Apart from 
dealing with other ex-Soviet members, Russia also sought to determine whether its place was in the 
European community or not.  
Of all former Soviet states, Belarus has traditionally been Russia’s closest ally and forms 
together with Russia the Union State of Belarus and Russia (Soyuznoye Gosudarstvo Rossii i Belarusi). 
Belarus, a landlocked country in the middle of Europe, is seen as the last dictatorship in Europe and 
has long been an international outcast (Marples 2005, 895). Scholars have argued that Belarusian- 
Russian relations are characterized by asymmetric interdependence in favor of Russia (Korosteleva 
2011 and Bruce 2005). Others have claimed that Belarus is deep into Russia’s sphere of influence 
(Dangerfield 2011, 221). This claim again indicates that Russia determines the rules of engagement 
and Belarus is the small ally, obligated to follow. This thesis will argue that these perspectives of 
Russian- Belarusian relations are too simple as reality shows a much more complex form of 
interdependency. It is true that Belarus in many aspects is dependent on Russia, but at the same time 
Russia cannot afford to lose its Western neighbor which gives Belarus far more space to maneuver 
than expected. 
This thesis will start with a quick explanation of realism, one of the dominant schools of 
thought in international relations theory. The main arguments of the realist theory are reflected in the 
bilateral relations between Belarus and Russia. However, instead of simply bandwagon or balance, 
Minsk effectively tries to bargain about the nature of the relations. These relations between Russia and 
Belarus are sometimes problematic as the interests of both states are not always compatible. The main 
dilemma between these two states is the degree of integration. Russia tries to obtain more leverage 
over Belarus, which in its turn is afraid to become too dependent on its stronger neighbor.  Therefore I 
argue that Russian- Belarusian relations can be modeled according to Robert’s Jervis security dilemma. 
In this dilemma, two states both try to increase their own security.  However, an increase of security of 
the first state automatically means the decrease of security of the other state (Jervis 1978, 169). 
Although the article of Jervis is primarily concerned with classical security which is related to state 
survival, the relations between Russia and Belarus reflect also non-classical security issues such as 
energy supplies and trade.  
When researching the stakes at interest for Russia and Belarus is becomes evident that both 
states have the same dilemma. Neither wants to lose the alliance between them but each want to 
bargain a better position against the other.  When all policy options are taken into consideration it is 
surprisingly Belarus which has the most options to maneuver in the security dilemma despite the fact 
that Russia seems more dominant. The key for Belarus’ position is pursuing a multi- vector foreign 
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policy. This policy is aimed at maintain good relations with different strategic actors of importance 
(Gnedina 2015, 1009). With this strategy Belarus can threaten Russia with looking for other allies in 
the region, mainly in the European Union. Russia on its turn does not have the option to pursue this 
multi- vector foreign policy as it represents a pole on its own. Furthermore Russia fears the loss of its 
Belarusian ally which would mean a sharp reduction in Russia’s sphere of influence. This concept is 
necessary for Russia as it is the main indicator that Russia, once again, is the great power it wants to 
be.  By threatening Russia with the prospect of seeking further integration with the European Union, 
Belarus effectively reduces Russian dominance in the Union State and undermines Russia’s leverage. 
These dynamics are of renewed importance in the post- Maidan period stretching from 2014 
until now and that is why this thesis will focus on this period. This period is marked by anti- 
governmental protests in Ukraine that were followed by the annexation of Crimea and a civil conflict 
in Eastern Ukraine wherein Russia played a role. After the events in Ukraine the relations between 
Russia and Belarus can be seen as a test case for the future of the Union State. On the one hand, with 
Ukraine seeking a more European direction, Russia needs other allies in Europe and we can argue that 
Belarus’ significance for Russia has increased. However, Belarusian president Alyaksandr Lukashenka 
feared a Ukrainian scenario in Belarus and became more careful towards Russian leverage over 
domestic affairs in Belarus (Astapenia and Balkunets 2016, 4). When taking these considerations into 
account, we see a new stage in the security dilemma between Belarus and Russia. Hereby Russia aims 
at strengthening the loyalty of Belarus, while Belarus turns more to the European Union to counter the 
Russian influence, thereby using its option of a multi- vector foreign policy.  
In order to conduct a detailed research, this thesis will be a case study on bilateral relations 
between Russia and Belarus both inside and outside the framework of the Union State in the period 
from 2014 until now. A case study is the best fitting research design to analyze a particular case in 
depth. The limitation of this research method is the low level of generalization as every case has its 
own characteristics. The main sources that will be used are secondary academic articles for clarifying 
the relevant theories and concepts. To focus more precisely on the bilateral relations I will make use of 
Russian language articles provided by newspapers, think tanks of both states and governmental 
statements of the Russian and Belarusian administrations. A special focus will lie on speeches and 
degrees from both presidents, Putin and Lukashenka, as both regimes have strong presidential features 
and are highly personalist in nature. Official documents from the Union State complement the primary 
sources.  
 
  
5 
 
2. Literature review  
To get an understanding about the relations between Russia and Belarus, the literature review section 
will provide an overview of bilateral relations in the context of the Union State. This organization is 
the institutional framework wherein the most aspects of bilateral relations between Moscow and 
Minsk are covered and it deals with relevant issues for this case study.  
 
Russian- Belarusian relations in the context of the Union State 
Relations between Russia and Belarus for a large part take place in the framework of the Union State, 
Soyuznoye Gosudarstvo in Russian. Since the dismantling of the Soviet Union, a series of bilateral 
agreements between Russia and Belarus aimed to form a military security union which also took the 
economic and political realm into account (Informatsionnyi analiticeskii portal Soyuznogo 
Gosudarsva 2016c). The cooperation started with the Customs Union in 1995 and was followed in the 
same year by the Treaty on Friendship, Good Neighborhood and Cooperation. A year later the two 
parliaments ratified the Commonwealth of Russia and Belarus and cooperation was completed with 
the Treaty on the Union of Russia and Belarus and the Declaration on further Unification. The Union 
State Treaty in 1999 completed the integration process and as a result of this treaty, the supranational 
bodies of the Union State were created (Vieira 2016, 3-4). The institutions of the Union are the 
Supreme State Council, parliament, Council of Ministers and the Committee of the Union state 
(Informatsionnyi analiticeskii portal Soyuznogo Gosudarsva 2016b). In the Supreme State Council the 
two presidents and prime- ministers are represented together with the speakers of the upper and lower 
houses of Belarus and Russia. The parliament consists of the two speakers of both national parliaments 
together with 70 deputies, with each state having an equal amount of seats in this parliament. Among 
the members of the council of ministers are the two prime- ministers and the  ministers of economics 
and foreign affairs together with some civil servants from the financial sector.  
Although the treaties and official cooperation seems promising, real decision- making and 
substantive integration remained a slow process. Based on the initial statements of the Union State, 
political and economic integration was the aim but it turned out that military cooperation was the most 
successful aspect (Deyermond 2004, 1193). The main reason for these developments is the congruence 
between the member states’ interests about military issues. Both Belarus and Russia faced the 
enlargement of NATO to their borders and deeper military cooperation was seen as a way to protect 
themselves against a possible NATO threat. Furthermore, Russia, as the dominant state in the Union, 
was able to direct the process of integration only to areas where its interests were met and it was in 
Russia’s interest to keep the integration out of the political realm (Idem, 1192).  The main political 
problems have to do with the inequality and the institutional setup of the Union State. Based on 
economy, population and territory, Russia is by far the stronger of the two states. However, the Union 
State was based on the principle of sovereignty and equality of both states and decision- making works 
according to the principle ‘one country, one vote’ (Susyaev 2011, 122). This means that Russia did not 
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feel a lot of incentives to integrate substantively on political and economic affairs as this would imply 
a relative loss of power for Moscow. Belarus on the other hand, and especially Lukashenka were eager 
to use the Union State as a tool to strengthen their position vis-a-vis Moscow. The standings of both 
sides were reflected in the media were Putin stressed the fact that the Belarusian economy is only 3% 
of the total Russian economy, a clear sign that Moscow did not feel very much for the principle of 
equality in the Union State. As a reaction, Lukashenka on its turn emphasized the conditions of 
equality and stated that he only wanted to cooperate under this principle (Vernidub 2002).  
Apart from the institutional problems, the relationship between Lukashenka and Putin was 
sometimes problematic as well (Marples 2008, 28). This friction was caused by the underlying policy 
direction of the Putin administration which was more interest driven in nature compared with the more 
ideological Yeltsin period. The initial relations between Yeltsin and Lukashenka were warm due to the 
fact that Yeltsin needed Russian- Belarusian integration out of domestic reasons and was therefore 
more committed to the Union State than Putin was. Where Yeltsin needed integration to counter the 
communists during election time, Putin’s position was not threatened domestically and his presidency 
was characterized by a pragmatic approach. His foreign policy was much more driven by economic 
interests and the ties between Russia and Belarus became more economized and less ideological in 
nature. Under the presidency of Putin, Belarus was more often portrayed as an economic burden on the 
Russian economy due to the low gas prices the regime paid, constantly stressing the economic 
disadvantage the relation meant to Russia (Klinke 2009, 119).  This narrative on Belarus can be seen 
in the wider context of Russia’s pragmatic approach towards the CIS states in the 2000’s. Based on the 
nation foreign policy concept of Russia, integration within the Union State can be seen a tool to 
strengthen the multilateral integration of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in the broader post- Soviet space (Ministerstvo 
inostrannikh del Rossiiskoi Federatsii 2013). Based on these aims we can conclude that further 
integration with Belarus should not be seen as a goal on itself anymore as it was in the Yeltsin era but 
is part of the pragmatic approach of Putin towards the entire post- Soviet space. Contrasting to Putin’s 
pragmatism, Lukashenka hoped to enlarge its power basis to Russia via the Union State.  
As a result of the institutional disadvantage for Russia and the pragmatism of Putin, Russia did 
not express further wishes to integrate. What is more, they wanted to obtain leverage over the 
Belarusian political realm, especially by buying up strategic assets in the economic sector (Konończuk 
2008, 31). After a series of economic disputes which became politicized , the gas wars in 2004, 2006 
and 2010, the milk war in 2010 as well and the potash war in 2013, Belarus also resisted the idea of 
further integration. Their main aim for Belarus is to secure the access to cheap Russian oil and gas.  
 The most successful aspect of the political cooperation between Russia and Belarus is regime 
survival, which especially applies to Belarus. Belarus is often criticized internationally for its lack of 
democratic norms and flawed elections. However, with Moscow providing political aid in order to 
legitimate the regime, Lukashenka managed to prevent any democratic process in its country 
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(Ambrosio 2006, 419). After the color revolutions in the post- Soviet space, both Lukashenka and 
Putin wanted to prevent a same scenario to happen in their countries and they became the so- called 
authoritarian allies together fighting upcoming democratic processes (Silitski 2007, 13).  
 A second political aspect which should be successful in theory is foreign policy. Based on 
official standings Russia and Belarus coordinate their foreign policies with each other. In the context 
of the Union State a foreign policy concept is made every two year wherein the strategy for the two 
states is outlined for the next years (Ministerstvo inostrannikh del Respublik Belarusi 2015, 
Informatsionnyi analiticeskii portal Soyuznogo Gosudarsva 2016a). However this concept is not 
binding and seems to matter more on paper than in reality. Although the Belarusian and Russian 
reactions to international issues are often similar, in the analysis we will see that in the past multiple 
disputes have erased over international and bilateral issues.  
In order to fully understand the bilateral relations between Russia and Belarus, we need to take 
the role of the EU into account out of geographical and geopolitical reasons. Although it is outside the 
scope of this thesis to study this in detail, we can say that relations with the EU have an impact on the 
bilateral relations in the Union State and relations within the Union State influence how both states 
perceive the EU. The EU is most relevant for the behavior of Belarus as this state seeks integration 
with the EU as part of its multi- vector foreign policy. The relations between Russia and the EU have 
been stable for a long time and are mostly seen in terms of a geopolitical zero- sum competition 
(Haukkala 2015, 32). In the context of Russia’s relations with other states in Europe, it is important for 
Moscow not to lose allies to the European Union as it happened in the case of Ukraine. 
 
3. Theoretical concepts 
This thesis will deal with a number of theoretical concepts to characterize the relations between 
Belarus and Russia. The theoretical angle from which relations are viewed is the grand theory of 
realism. Another important theoretical concept is the security dilemma of Robert Jervis, that reflects 
the framework in which the bilateral relations can be modelled. In order to define the foreign policy of 
Belarus, it is useful to elaborate further upon the notion of multi- vector foreign policy. This section 
will explain these theoretical concepts. 
 
Realism as the grand theory  
One of the most influential approaches of International Relations is the theory of realism. Realists 
assume states to be unitary rational actors who compete with each other for power in an anarchic 
world (Heywood 2011, 14). Neorealism is a category of the overarching realist theory and argues that 
the main determinant of states’ behavior is the structure of the system (Nye Jr. 1988, 241).  
Neorealism can be divided into offensive and defensive realism and each sub theory foresees different 
behavior based on structural factors.  
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Defensive realism assumes states to be security maximizers and constantly willing to balance 
the power of others. They stress the defensive nature of states and claim that wars are often not 
intended but unavoidable as interests of states do conflict sometimes (Lamy 2008, 131).  Offensive 
realists assume states to be power maximizers. They stress that states constantly fear the intentions of 
other states and the best way to secure survival is to maximize their own power and to become the 
hegemon in the system. (Mearsheimer 2001, 32- 40). Putin has many times claimed that Russia needs 
to be seen as a great power, a regional hegemon, and this has become one of the core aims of Putin’s 
presidencies (Tsygankov 2005, 133). Russia is the strongest state in the post- Soviet space and 
therefore this thesis will deal with Russia as a regional hegemon.  
Apart from the special focus on hegemons in the system, realism also provides a framework 
for small state behavior. Small states’ behavior is mostly reflected by the strategies of balancing or 
bandwagoning. Small states will look for alliances with other weak states to balance the power of the 
hegemon in the region. This balancing strategy might be the preferred option as no state in the 
balancing coalition is able to dominate another state. On the other hand, small states may join the 
alliance of the hegemon and therewith it tries to avoid that it will be the next victim of a stronger state 
and hopes to share in the spoils of victory, the bandwagon strategy (Walt 1985, 5-8). Whatever 
strategy states choose to follow, according to neo- realists both strong and weak states will ultimately 
aim to achieve a situation wherein no state is capable of dominating other states, the balance of power 
(Heywood 2011, 8). Small states will look for the balance of power within an alliance, strong states 
will look for it between the alliance they lead and those of their adversaries. This thesis will deal with 
Belarus as a small state.  
 
The security dilemma 
An important theoretical concept of the realist theory is the security dilemma. This dilemma represents 
a situation where in two states are both trying to increase their own security in an anarchic world. The 
problem with their actions is that an increase in security for state A is perceived as a threat to the 
security of state B (Jervis 1978, 169). The tragic of the security dilemma lies in the fact that state A 
does not intend to threaten the security of the other state but this is an automatic consequence of its 
attempts to increase its own security. As a result of these dynamics, building up a defensive arsenal 
might be interpreted as an offensive move. The interactions of states acting in a security dilemma 
reflects the core assumptions of the realist theory of both offensive and defensive realism. The 
overarching condition in the security dilemma is anarchy which leads to fear and distrust between 
states. According to offensive realism, states have no guarantee that the defensive moves of an 
adversary remain defensive and are therefore forced to build up their weapons which can result in an 
arms race. Defensive realism stresses the balance between defensive and offensive capabilities. This 
balance gives information about the incentives of the other states (Montogomery 2006, 156). The 
security dilemma mostly deals with defensive moves, which is in line with the logic of states as 
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security maximizers. However, in the security dilemma states do not have the information about what 
capacities are offensive and defensive and this may still cause unintended conflicts. 
 
A framework for multi- vector foreign policy 
Apart from balancing of bandwagoning, the two small states strategies realism predicts, small states 
that are located in between different regional blocs can try to bargain their position vis- a- vis different 
blocs instead of completely aligning with one of them (Gnedina 2015, 1009). Although realism is 
mainly focusing on balance and bandwagon strategies, bargaining  is not a very irrational strategy to 
follow either. From a realist point of view, multi- vector foreign policy can be seen as a tradeoff 
between security and autonomy based on a rational choice between the costs and benefits (Strakes 
2013, 47). This strategy aims to cooperate and co- habituate with all regional powers which are 
important for a state on all policy directions (Gnedina 2015, 1008). From a perspective of the ruling 
elite the main aim of a multi- vector foreign policy is protecting the rulers position and  maximizing 
personal wealth (Idem, 1010). These rulers want to protect their independence vis- a- vis different 
powerful actors and at the same time benefit from strategic alliances with them. 
In the academic literature, two states that are well known for their multi- vector foreign policy 
are Ukraine and Kazakhstan (Strakes 2013, 46).There are different prerequisites that make a multi- 
vector foreign policy more likely and Kazakhstan and Ukraine both represent one of these 
characteristics. First of all, multi- vector foreign policy is often associated with states that have a vast 
amount of natural resources which allow them to act independently (Minasyan 2012, 272). This facet 
is seen in the policies of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan who want to trade with both the West and the 
East. Thanks to their resources they are not depending on any of the two blocs and may act 
pragmatically according to their interests. Globalization has led to the current situation of economic 
interdependence wherein both the small states and the bigger states need each other (Martynau 2013, 
75). As is the case with Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, different blocs of great powers want to keep good 
relations with these states in order to have access to their resources. A second aspect which often 
characterizes states pursuing a multi- vector foreign policy is a weak self- identity which prevents a 
strong foreign policy direction (Cummings 2003, 146). A states that perfectly fits in this side of the 
spectrum is Ukraine. Ukraine is ethnically divided into Ukrainians and Russians and politically this 
division results in a part of the population that advocates the pro- European direction and those who 
favor stronger ties with Russia (Shmelova 2008, 22).  The foreign policy direction of an ethnically 
divided state can have serious consequences of national identity building as these states define 
themselves by their association with other states (Shulman 1998, 116). Multi-vector policy can be seen 
as a strategy that prevents one part of the country to be satisfied with the direction while the other is 
not.  
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4. Russian- Belarusian bilateral relations until 2014 
Although the bilateral relations between Russia and Belarus have been good overall, the last years we 
have seen some conflicts. As a consequence of these conflicts, I argue that the bilateral relations can 
be characterized according to Robert Jervis’ security dilemma.  
 
Conflicts between Russia and Belarus 
As we have seen in the overview of relations inside the Union State, the interests between Russia and 
Belarus are not always compatible. Where Belarus wanted to assure the supply of cheap gas, Russia 
wanted to obtain political leverage over Belarus and used its gas supplies for this goal. Most of the 
conflicts between Russia and Belarus are related to energy issues and more specifically to the price 
policies. This aspect of cooperation is not included in the overall agreements in context of the Union 
State and this leaves both states free to act unrestrictedly towards each other. In the years 2004, 2006 
and 2010 gas conflicts actually became known as real gas wars (Martynau 2013). During these 
conflicts, Belarus has showed that despite its weaker position from the start, that it was still able to hit 
Russia hard. Belarus did so by incorporating other issues and other actors in the bilateral conflicts. In 
the gas wars in 2006 and 2010 Minsk applied the strategy which damaged Russia the most, it 
threatened and later actually cut of the gas supplies to Europe. In 2006 it did so in order to secure its 
own supply, in 2010 Belarus stated that Moscow had to pay its debt for using Belarusian transit 
pipelines otherwise Belarus no longer would carry out the transit function (Osborn 2010). This 
decision proved to be very painful for Russia, as European states started to question their dependence 
on Russian energy and this decreased Russia’s image as a reliable energy partner (European Dialogue 
2010).  
According to experts, the real reason for the gas wars between the two members of the Union 
State is not related to the energy issues itself but has more to do with the other aspects of cooperation. 
In 2006 the gas war was related to the sale of the Belarusian national gas company Beltransgaz and in 
2010, the conflict was related to the refusal of Belarus to step in the Customs Union (Nekrashevich 
2010). It seems that Russia’s interests in these conflicts are not only domestically important but also 
related to its international image. To link gas conflicts to other issues of foreign policy with other 
actors is a very successful strategy of the Belarusian authorities to counter Russian pressure. By doing 
so, Belarus took the advantage out of these situational factors and Russia has more than once give 
Belarus the option it wanted in order to avoid international blame. 
The most painful moment for Russia came in 2009 when economic disputes were translated to 
the military domain, a field where the interests were mostly convergent in the past. The tensions in 
2009 where the first moment where military disputes between the two closest allies arose. In this year, 
Russia wanted to install the Collective Rapid Reaction Forces, in the framework of the CSTO. Russia 
wanted to install this special unit to give the military alliance new instruments to act collectively 
towards external threats. Initially Belarus refused to sign this initiative of Russia, which was the result 
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of economic disputes between the two states, and subsequently decided to boycott a CSTO summit 
(Vysotskaya Guedes Vieira 2014b, 562). The events in 2009, were the first time that bilateral disputes 
were spilling over to the multilateral realm and this was a new step in the strategy Minsk used against 
Moscow. For Russia, the CSTO formed an important international framework and is seen as Russia’s 
counterweight to NATO. This open conflict with Belarus over military issues was therefore double 
painful. The success of Belarus’ behavior is for a large part explained by the fact that disputes inside 
the Union State or in one specific sphere, like the economic tensions in 2009, are spilled over to other 
spheres and to other levels in the relations.   
 
The security dilemma between Russia and Belarus 
Apart from energy policies, the main subject of political bargaining between Russia and Belarus is the 
discussion over the level of integration. As indicated in the research of Konończuk, Russia’s primary 
aim is to dominate the Belarusian economy and its strategic parts. Belarus, on the other hand, is eager 
to protect its sovereignty and independence from Russia. This development is a remarkable turn in the 
official policy of Aleksandr Lukshenka, who was long seen as the main advocate of closer integration 
between Russia and Belarus. However, with the presidency of Putin and the economic- driven 
approach, Lukashenka has realized that Russian interests are not always the same as Belarusian 
interests. The main conflict which illustrates the different interests, are the attempts of Russia to buy 
up strategic assets in Beltransgaz, the national gas company of Belarus which controlled all the 
pipelines on Belarusian territory. Already in his speech on Independence Day in 2006, Lukashenka 
stated clearly that Belarus is not willing to allow investments that lead to the loss of sovereignty and 
independence for Belarus on its own territory when he was referring to the negotiations between 
Gazprom and Beltransgaz (Lukashenka 2006). These statements of Lukashenka perfectly reflect the 
main dilemma in Russian- Belarusian bilateral relations. On the one hand, Belarus expresses the fear 
to lose their national independence and sovereignty. On the other hand, Russia stresses its wish to do 
business and claims to act according to treaties which were signed one year prior to this gas conflict 
(RosBiznecKonsalting 2006). Obviously, Russia wants to obtain shares of Beltransgaz as this gives 
Russia apart from economic power also political power. However it is too far to say that Russia wants 
to take over the complete Belarusian state, as suggested by Lukashenka in his Independence speech. 
Another example when it comes to dilemma’s regarding the level of integration was raised by 
Putin when he stated that Belarus should become a subject of the Russian Federation. In the Summer 
of 2002, three ideas regarding further integration were initiated by the Russian side. One advocated the 
status quo wherein Belarus remains an independent and sovereign state, the second favored the 
entrance of Belarus in the Russian Federation according to the principle of ordinary subjects. The third 
proposal, which was favored by the Russian administration, was the entry of Belarus as six or seven 
oblasts in the federal administration of the Russian Federation (Gordeychik 2004) . According to 
Russian politicians, in this model the regional Belarusian elite can be turned into loyalists  to Moscow 
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and in this institutional set up some aspects of the Belarusian identity can be preserved to avoid the 
rise of nationalistic protests (Ibidem).  
Compared with the security dilemma of Jervis, the security dilemma between Russia and 
Belarus is about non- classical security issues and not about the threat of going to war where Jervis 
related to. The dilemma in the Union State is concentrated towards the levels of integration and the 
degree of integration can be seen as the notion of security.  For Russia, integration and security are 
represented by economic leverage and influence over domestic affairs in Belarus. On the other side, 
Minsk sees security as the protection of its independence and sovereignty. Every move of Russia to 
obtain more leverage in the economic sectors of Belarus, is perceived in Minsk as a threat towards its 
sovereignty and independence and thus survival. However, every move of Belarus to negotiate more 
independence for itself, leaves Russia feeling without allies and this is perceived as a threat towards 
Russian security. The fear of losing allies in Europe is for Moscow a possible threat against the EU, 
especially in the light of the zero- sum competition over the shared neighborhood. This security 
dilemma in the Russian- Belarusian Union State is even further aggravated by the power asymmetries 
between the two states. In general, stronger states have used alliances to exert control over the smaller 
states in the alliance (Van Staden 1995, 36). As a result of this, it is logical that Belarus fears the fact 
that Russia becomes too dominant in bilateral relations. According to Kydd , successful cooperation 
between stronger and weaker states requires a certain level of trust between them. Trust here means 
that each state can have certain expectation about the other state’s behavior, which should not be 
harmful towards the other (Korolev 2015, 303). However, the attempts of Russia to buy strategic 
assets in the Belarusian economy is harmful to Belarusian sovereignty and this policy has decreased 
the level of trust and led to more tensions in light of the security dilemma.   
Apart from bargaining over the gas conflicts Minsk is also trying to pursue a classical 
response from the realist perspective to counter Russian influence, balancing. Lukashenka has stated 
that when the integration between the member states of the Eurasian Economic Union is sufficient, he 
advocates to abolish the Union State (Guneev 2014). Lukashenka hopes to include other states in the 
bilateral relations as strengthening a multilateral alliance is his strategy to escape the security dilemma. 
It is indeed a reliable solution as this would lessen the direct influence Russia can have towards 
Belarus. In the Eurasian Union, decision- making is based on unanimity and this means a serious loss 
of Russian leverage towards any of the member states (Popescu 2014, 11). With these statements the 
Belarusian president, stresses that he is looking for other allies to counter the influence of the regional 
hegemon. This is in line with the realist notion of balancing, a logical strategy for small states. Despite 
Lukashenka’s attempts to escape the security dilemma, the post- Maidan period brought the security 
dilemma back to the middle of the attention as I will show in the analysis.  
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5. The actual security dilemma since the Ukraine crisis 
Since the Maidan protests and the following war in Ukraine, the geopolitical situation in Europe has 
changed radically. Belarus and Russia have had different roles in these changes and new policy 
discrepancies between the close allies have been witnessed. In this chapter I will research the reactions 
of both states towards the annexation of Crimea, and the developments with regards to a Russian 
military base on Belarusian territory. These two topics are a good reflection of the relations from 2014 
on, and an analysis of them will affirm that recent bilateral relations can be modelled according to a 
security dilemma. However, this chapter will conclude that since the conflict in Ukraine the intra- 
alliance security dilemma is a better representation of bilateral relations than the classical security 
dilemma.  
 
Reactions to the annexation of Crimea 
The annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation and the following war in Eastern Ukraine are the 
most important changes since the protests on Maidan and these events directly showed the different 
policies of Belarus and Russia towards these events. On the 16
th
 of March the citizens of Crimea voted 
in a referendum to become part of the Russian Federation. In Russia this movement is named the 
joining of Crimea and the Russian name stresses the term accession, prisoyedineniye. Although in the 
West it is widely seen as a pure annexation of Crimea by Russia and it was the beginning of an 
international crisis in the relations between Russia and the EU. In his speech to deputies of the State 
Duma, president Vladimir Putin stressed the common history of Crimea and Russia and the argument 
that Crimea was always part of the Russian empire became the cornerstone of the Russian argument to 
justify the annexation (Putin 2014). Some scholars have claimed that Russia’s actions were completely 
in line with the logic of realism and it was Putin’s answer to Western attempts to make Ukraine 
member of the NATO (Mearsheimer 2014, 77). However, Russian citizens and public mainly talk 
about the historical error which has been adjusted.  
 The Belarusian people had the same opinion regarding this matter as their Russian 
counterparts and they supported the Russian actions (Vysotskaya Guedes Vieira 2014a, 103). However, 
the government did not completely align with the Russians and their actions showed the value of 
Belarus’ multi- vector foreign policy. President Lukashenka stated that if Crimea was historically part 
of Russia, Russia itself needs to be given to Kazakhstan and Mongolia, whereby he was referring to 
the Mongol yoke and the time the territory of contemporary Russia was occupied by the Mongols 
(Nezavisimoye byuro novostey 2014). Several times Lukashenka claimed to support the territorial 
integrity of states and kept good relations with the new Ukrainian authorities, even when he knew the 
Russian objections. On the other side, Lukashenka accepts Crimea as the facto part of Russia  and 
supports the non- aligned status of Ukraine, thereby opposing the possibility that Ukraine would join 
any Western alliance (Butaev 2014).  The last two statements are important standings for Russia. In 
the context of the Eastern Partnership, Lukashenka is even more explicit in defending Russia  by 
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refusing to sign a declaration to condemn the annexation. Together with Armenia, Belarus did not 
want to stab Russia to death, as Lukashenka calls it, and thinks that the Eastern Partnership should stay 
out other conflicts (Zerkalo Nedeli 2015).  
 Another clear sign that Belarus successfully tried to remain neutral is the role of mediator in 
the peace process between Russia, the self- proclaimed republics of Donetsk and Luhansk and Ukraine. 
The reason why these peace talks were hosted by Belarus lies in the fact that Belarus has remained in 
dialogue with both Ukraine and Russia and was from the beginning of the conflict a rather neutral 
force. Thanks to the role of mediator, Lukashenka has become an important neutral player in the 
conflict and has portrayed himself as someone who in the first place wants to establish peace. Belarus’ 
position can have good consequences in the future as this might cause the European Union to become 
less hostile towards the regime in Minsk. This indeed was the case as the motivations of the EU to lift 
sanctions against Belarus was partly related to their standings in the negotiating process.  
 
Dispute over the Russian airbase 
After the different opinions with regards to the situation in Ukraine, the conflict over Russia’s wish to 
operate an airbase in 2015 was a new episode in the tense relations between Russia and Belarus after 
the Crimean annexation. Before the annexation of Crimea, Russia already operated a radio station near 
Vileyka and both Russian as Belarusian forces are located at the airbase in Baranovichi. In the end of  
2015 Russia expressed the wish to deploy a new Russian airbase on the territory of Belarus, and 
president Putin had already signed a degree about this matter. The deployment of such base could be 
seen as the Russian answer to NATO threats related to the crisis in Ukraine and should act like a 
sword of Damocles for Poland and the Baltic states. Furthermore it would give Russia more leverage 
in military affairs in Belarus or the Union State and Russia has used the argument to defend the 
external borders of the Union State as a reason for its wish. If the tensions between Russia and NATO 
start to build up further, Russia needs to have the guarantee of a loyal Belarus as its political and 
military ally (Klaskovsky 2016b).  
Despite Russian pressure, the Belarusian president has voiced that from a military point of 
view, neither Russia nor Belarus needs a Russian airbase in Belarus. In April 2016 the Belarusian 
minister of foreign affairs, Sergey Makey, stated that the Belarusian side definitely refused Russia’s 
demand (Bondarenko 2016). The reason why Belarus refused this question was the fear to lose more 
independence, a fear that was triggered by Russia’s actions to Ukraine. Lukashenka explicitly 
mentioned that in times of crises and rising tensions, states first of all need to rely on their own forces 
(Vzglyad 2015). This line of behavior can perfectly been explained by Belarus fear to become too 
closely involved in the Ukraine crisis. If the Russians had wished to establish a second front in 
Ukraine or even more serious, an armed conflict against NATO, a military base on Belarusian territory 
is a very well located starting point for it (Kaspruk 2015).   
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The intra- alliance security dilemma 
The different reactions to the conflict in Ukraine and the question whether Russia was allowed to place 
a military base in Belarus were two events that perfectly reflected the dynamics between the two 
members of the Union State since the conflict in Ukraine. Based on these two events we can still 
conclude that Belarus and Russia are indeed in a security dilemma. However, the security dilemma 
between Belarus and Russia is even better represented by the intra- alliance security dilemma of 
Vysotskaya Guedes Vieira. Although the general questions about the degree of integration still matter 
and can be modeled according to Jervis’ dilemma, the intra- alliance security dilemma better 
represents a situation wherein two allies are facing a tense external situation like a nearby war, and 
each has different ways of dealing with it.  The intra- alliance dilemma refers to the situation where 
two allies have not completely compatible interests regarding the external situation and therefore 
actions of one can lead to doubts about its reliability by the other state (Vysotskaya Guedes Vieira 
2014a, 98).  In this intra- alliance dilemma states can fear entrapment, be driven into a war of crises 
over the interests of the ally wherein itself has no interests, or abandonment, be left alone by the other 
state. The strategy to follow when a state fears abandonment is to show more commitment to the 
alliance. However this can result in too strong commitment which can on its turn increase the risks of 
entrapment. States that fear entrapment will behave the other way around and will try to loosen the 
alliance, whereby too much distance between states can lead to abandonment. These two different 
strategies vis-a- vis each other is the dilemma states in alliances are facing.  
In the period from 2014 on, Russia is the state fearing abandonment as it wishes to keep 
Belarus as an ally. Based on the strategies in the intra- alliance security dilemma Russia wants to 
increase the integration with Belarus and the wish to deploy a military base is a logical step for this. 
On the other hand, Belarus wants to avoid to become part of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. 
Promoting itself as a neutral player between Ukraine and Russia is a guarantee that Belarus is not 
associated with one side of the conflict and makes it possible to stay out of the fighting. Despite the 
statements from Lukashenka that Belarus does not fear Russian military actions on its territory, some 
scholars have stated that this was exactly what the president feared. Some Belarusian analysts were 
afraid that Russian green men, a synonym for soldiers, would show up in Belarus and that Belarus, 
together with Ukraine and Moldova, would become the battlefield in the new cold war  (Klaskovsky 
2016a). Although at the moment Russia has no interest in invading Belarus, the fear itself was 
sufficient for Lukashenka to refuse a Russian military base in Belarus and move away from Russian 
dominance.  
 
6. How do Russia and Belarus deal with the security dilemma? 
When states find themselves in a security dilemma, both actors try to get the best outcome that is 
fitting their interests. The intra- alliance security dilemma predicts different strategies and different 
interests for both Belarus and Russia. This chapter will show how Russia and Belarus act in the 
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security dilemma and whether their policies can be considered to be successful. It concludes that 
Minsk is the most successful actor as its strategy, a multi- vector foreign policy, is rewarding against 
the interests that are driving the Russian policies. I will first give a more detailed overview of Russia’s 
interests in the Russian- Belarusian security dilemma and thereafter I will explain the success of 
Belarus’ strategy.  
 
Russia’s interests  
As we have seen the relations between Russia and Belarus can be modeled according to a security 
dilemma wherein every state has different interests with regards to the degree of integration. The 
interests for Belarus are rather straight forward, it wants to be an independent state that is able to 
determine its own political direction. Therefore the interests of Belarus are mostly aimed at keeping 
the level of integration low in order to defend their own independence. Russia, the other actor in this 
security dilemma wants to integrate deeply as it hopes to gain more leverage of Belarus in this way. 
There are several reasons why Russia is so keen on keeping Belarus in its own alliance or sphere of 
influence.  
First of all, Russia needs Belarus in order to remain a regional hegemon which is one of the 
core policy concepts of Russia (Urnov 2014). The claim to be a great power can serve as an effective 
domestic tool in order to distract public attention away from domestic problems and revive 
nationalistic feelings and this is one of the reason why this concept is so important for Putin (Idem, 
306). Russia knows it cannot compete with other actors for global hegemony and therefore Moscow 
now aims at defending her status as regional hegemon. However, also this position is disputable as 
Russia lacks both the hard power as the soft power to attract all states in the post- Soviet region. As 
Moscow knows this, it sees the allies it still has as the only remaining element of its great power status 
and these states has thus gained importance in Russia’s political discourse. The renewed pressure of 
Moscow on the post- Soviet states to strengthen the integration projects the CIS region is the logical 
step to secure Russia’s status as regional hegemon (Idem, 313).  The most successful Russian led 
integration project is the Eurasian Economic Union and the importance of Belarus herein has 
significantly  improved since Ukraine has definitely opted for the European choice (Klaskovsky 2014).  
Apart from the geopolitical significance of Belarus, the strong ties with Minsk are also part of Russia’s 
domestic identity as they are based on a common history and culture. Altogether an alliance with 
Belarus serves both domestic as international purposes (Konończuk 2008, 36).  
Secondly, Belarus functions as an important buffer in both military and economic terms. 
Belarus’ role of transit state in economic affairs mostly touches upon trade in resources between 
Russia and several EU states, which is an important motor for the Russian economy. One of the 
biggest gas recipients and thus Russia’s most important client is Germany. In its trade with Germany 
and other European states, Russian gas is transported via pipelines crossing different post- Soviet 
states, of which Belarus is a very relevant example (Korosteleva 2011, 576) . The fact that Russian gas 
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needs to pass other countries weakens Russia’s position as the transit states can use this 
interdependency to bargain. Belarus has benefitted from its transit status several times by charging 
Russia with costs to make use of Belarusian pipelines. This fact does not mean that Belarus is the 
dominant party, since Minsk is still heavily dependent on Russian gas. However, this shows that 
Russia cannot simply afford to turn its back on Belarus as this would harm Russia’s trade with other 
European states, one of the fundaments of Russia’s political and economic status quo.  
Apart from the fact that Belarus has bargaining power as a transit state for Russia’s gas, Minsk 
also serves as a buffer for Russia against a potential NATO threat (Astapenia and Balkunets 2016, 20). 
NATO is in both states seen as an adversary military bloc and this might also be the explanation of 
close military cooperation in the Union State. Furthermore Belarus is the only ally of Russia that is 
directly bordering NATO members and this position increases the significance of a loyal Minsk. 
According to the balance of threat logic of Walt, states fear proximate enemies more than rivals at the 
other side of the world (Walt 1985,18). When turning this argument in the order direction, we can also 
argue that allies, closely located to the perceived threat are more important for the hegemon than allies 
far away from it. In the case of Russia this means that in the struggle for security against NATO, 
Belarus is a more important ally than Armenia or Kazakhstan, even when the political or military 
significance is not taken into account. This logic explains why Russia is not facing the same 
integration dilemma with other allies as we can argue that the stakes  are the highest when it comes to 
the integration with Belarus. 
When combining all the reasons why Belarus is important back to the security dilemma, we 
see that Russia’s interests in integrating with Belarus have been constantly significant. Although they 
have seriously increased after the post Maidan period and an increase in interests means that the 
perceived losses when this does not happen, have increased as well. This means that the Russian 
vulnerability in the alliance has increased after 2014. Russia cannot afford to lose Belarus and the only 
strategy Russia can follow to serve its interests is by investing in the alliance and listen to the 
Belarusian demands. This fact gives Belarus more tools to bargain and to harm Russia on the topic 
where Russia is most vulnerable.  
 
An overview of Belarus’ multi- vector foreign policy 
Belarus has a good strategy to follow when it wants to distance itself away from Russia and gain more 
independence for itself, a multi- vector foreign policy. Although Belarus does not have the classical 
features of a multi- vector foreign policy state, it definitely pursues this strategy and it is supported by 
the majority of the population and even the opposition (Rotman and Veremeeva 2011, 76). As a 
consequence of Belarus’ geographical location, Minsk mostly aims at balancing between the European 
Union and Russia, the two geopolitical blocs in the Europe. Belarus also tries to include other poles in 
the world and has economic and military ties with China and Latin American states (Frear 2013, 135). 
However, these actors are less significant than the European powers and therefore this overview will 
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focus on Belarus relations with the EU and Russia. Belarus multi- vector foreign policy is aimed at 
balancing the political pressure from the EU with the economic pressure from Russia. Belarus has an 
ethnically homogenous society, but foreign policy preferences are mixed in Belarus and this makes it 
easier for the authorities to conduct a multi- vector foreign policy. The society is roughly equally 
divided into pro- European and pro- Russian advocates and this cleavage is not ethnically based but 
divides people who grew up in the Soviet Union and people who grew up in an independent Belarus 
(Ulakhnovich 2011, 84).When we overview the bilateral relations of Belarus with these actors, we can 
conclude that relations with one actor have an effect on Belarus’ relation with the other actor.  
In the beginning years of the presidency of Lukashenka starting from 1994, the door to the EU 
was closed as a result of critics on the flawed elections in Belarus with regard to the amendment of the 
Constitution. In this period Belarus had very good relations with Moscow which turned in the 
beginning of 2006. After a series of disputes between the two Slavic states in these years relations with 
Russia deteriorated and Belarus and the EU were both looking for rapprochement with each other 
(Rotman and Veremeeva 2011, 94). The accession of Belarus in the Eastern Partnership program can 
be seen as a good step in the EU-Belarus  relations but as indicated before, Minsk never completely 
fulfilled the demands and aspirations of the EU. The Russian Federation is the other  important pole in 
Belarus’ multi-vector foreign policy, and Moscow is historically the closest ally of Minsk. Due to 
Belarus’ lack of natural resources and the historical interdependence between the two former Soviet 
states, Russia is able to exert influence on Belarus via both the economy and political support. Belarus’ 
lack of natural resources makes the country economically very dependent on Russia and Russia can 
use energy issues to keep Minsk in its sphere of influence.  Despite the participation of Belarus in the 
Eurasian integration projects and the tense relations with the EU , Minsk did not unilaterally opted for 
Russia and this resulted in the abovementioned conflicts wherein Belarus was able to keep a 
significant distance from Russian leverage via bargaining. 
 
The success of a multi- vector foreign policy 
Based on the definition of Gnedina, the success of a multi- vector foreign policy depends on the 
amount of wealth and independence of the elite (Gnedina 2015, 1010). When we look to the situation 
of the entire state, the most important aspect of success is to remain independent from any of the 
bigger blocs in the region. Most of the states that conduct a multi- vector foreign policy are located in 
the middle of different hegemons and can play both sides in order to remain relatively independent 
from any of the hegemons. A case study on the success of Belarus’ multi- vector foreign policy 
perfectly shows this logic. 
 As indicated in the framework, Belarus bargains with both the EU and Russia to counter 
pressure of one and the other. Both of these blocs have different interests. The EU wants to extent their 
influence and norms to the participating states in the Eastern Partnership (Bosse and Korosteleva-
Polglase 2009, 145) . Many states participating in this framework have indeed opened themselves for 
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these norms but Belarus remains an outlier in this regard. Belarus is willing to open itself more to the 
EU out of economic incentives, but this does not mean that Minsk opens itself for EU external 
governance and its normative rules (Idem, 156). In the context of the interaction between Russian- 
Belarusian relations and Belarusian- EU relations, more interaction with the EU should not be seen as 
a pro- European choice but simply as an attempt to distance itself from Russia. The reason why the EU 
cannot thoroughly influence the Belarusian political situation is the efficient bargaining strategy 
Belarus follows whereby it never commits itself too strong to the European choice, a basis for its 
multi- vector foreign policy, Thanks to this strategy Belarus is able to keep the political pressure from 
the EU out, but at the same time benefits from the EU when the relations have improved somewhat. 
Without altering much in the political system, the EU lifted their sanctions against Belarus in February 
2016 partly as a result of the role of mediator in the Ukraine crisis.  
In its relations with the EU, Belarus’ multi-vector foreign policy made it possible for Minsk to 
follow its own political path and the same logic applies to relations between Russia and Belarus. 
Based on the realist notion of international relations, bilateral relations between Russia and Belarus 
can be seen through the lens of an alliance between a regional hegemon and a weaker ally. According 
to this theoretical framework, Belarus is bandwagoning with Russia and since Moscow is the stronger 
of the two Russia should be able to determine the strategy and political course to follow. However, 
what we see in the Union State is not simply a Belarusian bandwagon to a dominant Russia but 
relations between the two states are formed through political bargaining. Hereby Minsk has proven to 
be able to protect its own interests and independence regarding policy issues that were the core 
interests of Russia (Martynau 2013, 86). A direct success of multi- vector foreign policy was the fact 
that Russia was once again willing to support the Belarusian economy. This year, Minsk  was given a 
loan worth of two million dollar (Alesin 2016). According to the Lithuanian researcher Laurynas 
Kasčiūnas, the fact that Russia is supporting Minsk even in times of severe economic problems in 
Russia, can be seen as the evidence that Russia’s behaviour represents the logic of an imperial power 
(Ukrainskaya Pravda 2016). The fact that Russia grands Belarus a loan is completely in line with 
Russia’s interests as this commitment to the alliance might result in a deeper level of integration. This 
loan can strengthen Russia’s position in Belarus but does not directly give Russia more economic or 
political leverage over Belarus. Also in relations towards Moscow we can argue that Minsk has proven 
to be a rather independent actor in the last years and has successfully countered Russia’s pressure, but 
still benefits from the alliance with Moscow.  
 
Why multi- vector foreign policy makes Belarus stronger vis-à-vis Russia 
Belarus has been quite successful in the process of political bargaining in the bilateral relations with 
Russia. However, bargaining has not been the only tool for Belarus as the real reason for Belarus’ 
success lies in the strategy of multi- vector foreign policy.  
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Compared with the EU, the stakes for Russia to integrate with Belarus are much higher and 
therefore the Russians are putting a lot of effort in good relations with Minsk. Also in the bilateral 
security dilemma, Moscow has more interests in integrating with Belarus than Minsk has in keeping 
its independence. With the pursuit of a multi- vector foreign policy and keeping good relations with 
different actors, Belarus can intimidate Russia by threatening to seek more integration with the EU or 
other players like China. As we have seen in the intra- alliance security dilemma the fear of 
abandonment, that follows when Minsk seeks more integration with Europe, makes Moscow only 
pushing harder to keep the alliance with Belarus strong and Russia will put more effort in the relations, 
accepting more of the Belarusian demands. In order words, thanks to the multi- vector foreign policy 
Belarus knows that it has get more space to maneuver and that its bargaining position has increased 
vis-à-vis Russia. The last year’s loan of Russia to Belarus was a good example of the Belarusian 
strength. As a result of the lifted sanctions by the EU, Moscow feared more integration between Minsk 
and Brussels and this would mean a loss of leverage from the side of Moscow. In order to counter an 
increased role of the EU, Russia issued Belarus a loan first and foremost to protect its leverage over 
Belarus. Russia on its turn, already uses all the tools it has to increase its own bargaining position in 
the Union State and the other fields of bilateral relations. The main difference in options between 
Moscow and Minsk is that Russia cannot threaten with a multi- vector foreign policy as Russia 
represents a bloc on its own.  Russia uses its energy dominance and its economic power but has no 
geopolitical strategy like Belarus has. Furthermore, it cannot come up with an answer without harming 
its own bargaining position.  
We can argue that the multi- vector foreign policy is a strategy for Belarus to alter the security 
dilemma. Russia still seeks to integrate but as a result of the threat to lose Belarus completely, Minsk 
can take more initiative in the alliance . Multi- vector foreign policy is not a way to escape the 
dilemma completely as Belarus is Russia’s neighbor and on its turn very depending on Russia’s 
economic aid. The multi- vector foreign policy does not mean that Belarus is the dominant party in the 
alliance since Russia still is the stronger of the two. However, multi- vector foreign policy offers 
Belarus a strategy to stall Russia and give itself a much better position than we would expect on the 
power divisions between the states. Altogether Belarus’ option of multi- vector foreign policy has led 
to a far more complex relationship, that is characterized by a high form of interdependence between 
Russia and Belarus. The relations are rather symmetrical and this makes the two states almost equal to 
each other in their bilateral relations.  
 
7. Conclusion 
This thesis has researched the bilateral relations between Belarus and Russia in the context of the 
Union State but also outside this framework. It has tried to challenge the statements of several scholars, 
who argue that the relations are characterized by an asymmetrical interdependence in favor of Russia. 
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In this research the ultimate conclusion was that bilateral relations between Russia and Belarus are 
rather symmetrical thanks to the option for Belarus to pursue a multi- vector foreign policy.  
This thesis has challenged the general standings by framing the bilateral relations according to 
a security dilemma. In general, the relations can be seen as the security dilemma  of Jervis, wherein the 
security question is the dilemma over the degree of integration. More integration is for Russia an 
increase in its security but unintended, Moscow herewith threatens the security of Minsk as Belarus 
favors a low level of integration in order to keep a high degree of independence.    
 The time frame on which this thesis was primarily focusing,  was the period after the Maidan 
protests in Ukraine. Bilateral relations in the years after 2014 can again be modeled according to the 
security dilemma but the intra- alliance security dilemma is even a better representation. This model 
focuses on allies facing a difficult external situation and have different strategies towards it. The 
differences in strategies arose after the annexation of Crimea which was not supported by Belarus. 
According to the intra- alliance security dilemma, Russia, the state that sought more integration, was 
fearing to be abandoned and pushed for even more integration. Belarus, protecting its independence, 
feared to be entrapped in a conflict over Ukraine which was not in line with the Belarusian interests. 
Through this dilemma, we see the regular security dilemma reinforced and questions regarding 
integration played a substantive role between Belarus and Russia since 2014.  
 When modeling relations according to a security dilemma, the interests of both states in this 
dilemma need to be analyzed. When doing this, we see that Russia has higher interests to keep a high 
degree of integration compared with the height of Belarusian interests to keep the degree of integration 
low. This all has to do with the Belarusian strategy of multi- vector policy which can serve as a 
possibility to protect its independence vis-à-vis Russia. Multi- vector foreign policy is mostly pursued 
by small states that are located in between different regional hegemons and can be seen as a bargain to 
get the best of both sides. Belarus, located between Russia and the EU tries to play the two actors 
against each other and therewith it tries to protect the Belarusian independence.  
 This strategy, the option of Belarus to seek other partners apart from Russia, is the reason why 
the relations between Russia and Belarus are more equally balanced than scholars thought or 
sometimes even in favor of Belarus. As the Russian interests to keep the alliance with Belarus are 
higher than the Belarusian interests, Moscow has more to lose and this makes Russia vulnerable. 
Russia’s vulnerability is even more aggravated by the fact that Belarus can threaten Russia by seeking 
more integration with the EU.  Losing Belarus would mean a serious loss in Russia’s sphere of 
influence, one of the most important aspects of Russia’s role as hegemon in Europe and one of the 
dominant aspects of Putin’s presidencies. Belarus’ multi- vector foreign policy can seriously 
undermine Russia’s position in Europe and Russia wants to avoid this loss at any costs. 
As Belarus is aware of the crucial role it plays for Russia’s hegemonic identity, it has 
effectively bargained to the best options for itself, as this was shown with regards to the refusal to 
allow a Russian airbase on Belarusian territory. Russia is afraid that Belarus will ultimately opt for 
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Europe and is willing to accept more in order to protect the longevity of the alliance and the friendly 
relations with Belarus. Russia on its turn, does not have a bargain tool against Belarus, since Russia 
still needs Belarus in the fields wherein Russia is dominant, like the resource sector. 
Based on the power asymmetries between Moscow and Minsk it is hardly surprising to say 
that relations are in favor of Russia. However, apart from the two classical strategies for small states, 
bandwagoning and balancing, bargaining has proved to be a very effective strategy to alter the power 
relations between a small state and a regional hegemon. With the ongoing globalization and the 
interdependency that comes with it, other small states might think of this strategy to increase their 
position in an alliance. Although the main reason why Belarus’ bargain is so successful is the 
possibility Minsk has to pursue a multi- vector foreign policy and this is something not every small 
state can do automatically. Therefore further research on the success of bargaining needs to be done. 
The case study on Belarus- Russia relations has shown the power of multi- vector foreign policy and 
the possibility this strategy gives to bargain a better position for the smaller states in alliances. 
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